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“CURST BE HE THAT MOVES MY BONES:”∗
THE SURPRISINGLY CONTROLLING ROLE OF RELIGION IN
EQUITABLE DISINTERMENT DECISIONS
PETER ZABLOTSKY∗∗

I.

INTRODUCTION

At least since the nineteenth century, the courts in the United States
have had to decide cases involving disinterment.1 The challenges posed by
this task have been continuous, with disputes over the remains of slain civil
rights era victim Emmett Till and the remains of soldiers killed in Iraq
providing the most recent, trying contexts.2 The circumstances surrounding
these private disputes are difficult, heart wrenching, and compelling—a
bitter conflict arises among grieving surviving family members; 3 or, a
conflict between some family members on the one hand, and the beliefs of a
decedent who was a devout follower of a religion, supported by the
representatives of the consecrated ground of that religion, on the other.4
As there are no ecclesiastical courts in the United States, one might
expect that disinterment disputes—at least in those instances in which the
decedent failed to execute the relevant legally controlling document—
would be resolved in equity based upon the interests of the feuding next-ofkin; and in fact, in cases in which religion is not a factor, this is precisely
what has happened.5 Surprisingly, however, in cases in which religion is
relevant, it has assumed a controlling role. In these cases, religious
concerns permeate every aspect of the analysis, and trump the equities that
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Peter Zablotsky is a Professor of Law at the Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.
He received his Juris Doctor from the Columbia University School of Law in 1980.
1. See R.F. Martin, Annotation, Removal and Reinterment of Remains, 21 A.L.R.2d 472
(2004) [hereinafter Removal and Reinterment] (discussing early cases involving disinterment).
2. Gretchen Ruethling, Kin Disagree on Exhumation of Emmett Till, N.Y. TIMES, May 6,
2005 at A23; Dean E. Murphy & Carolyn Marshall, Family Feuds Over Soldier’s Remains, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2005, at A14.
3. See, e.g., Removal and Reinterment, supra note 1, at 474; Heather Conway, Dead, But Not
Buried: Bodies, Burial and Family Conflicts, 23 LEGAL STUD. 423, 423-24 (2003).
4. See Removal and Reinterment, supra note 1, §§ 11, 14, 15 (providing discussions on
religious considerations, conflict between spouse and blood relations or cemeteries or religious
architecture, and conflict among blood relations, or between them and the cemetery or religious
authorities); see also Kieron McEvoy & Heather Conway, The Dead, the Law, and the Politics of
the Past, 31 J. L. & SOCIETY 539, 540 (2004) (discussing cultural and political conflicts relating
to dead bodies).
5. See supra text accompanying note 3 (considering private disputes regarding disinterment).
∗∗
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normally operate in favor of the next-of-kin. Indeed, a review of the relevant authorities appears to compel a universally applicable conclusion, to
wit, while the circumstances of the disputes surrounding disinterment are
difficult and varied, there is at least, unity in result. The courts have refused
to allow disinterment in every case involving a decedent who showed by his
actions that he was devoted to his religion, whose remains were interred in
the consecrated ground of his religion, and whose disinterment was prohibited by the beliefs and practices of his religion. Put another way, there
are no cases in which a court has allowed disinterment at the behest of a
surviving family member when the decedent was religious, interred in the
consecrated ground of that religion, and the belief system of that religion
forbade disinterment.6
This article examines and analyzes the controlling role religion has
assumed in disinterment cases. After briefly reviewing some general background material, the article turns to a discussion of the role of religion in
determining the wishes of the decedent. Next, the article examines the role
of religious institutions when they inject themselves with the disinterment
decision. Then, the article looks at the effect religion has on the public
interest as it relates to disinterment generally, and statutes addressing
disinterment, specifically. Finally, the article considers the impact of the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause on these religious
oriented disinterment decisions.
II. BACKGROUND
Without exception, disputes regarding disinterment are decided,
ostensibly, by well-settled, decades old equitable considerations. More
generally, state courts in the United States have long held that there is a
strong presumption against disinterment,7 going so far as to limit the act to
a “rare emergency”8 or “circumstances of extreme exigency,”9 and require a
showing of “strong and convincing evidence.”10
6. See, e.g., Mitty v. Oliveira, 244 P.2d 921, 929 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Friedman v.
Gomel Chesed Hebrew Cemetery Ass’n, 92 A.2d 117, 119-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952);
Dutcher v. Paradise, 217 A.D.2d 774, 775 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Goldman v. Mollen, 191 S.E.
627, 634-35 (Va. 1937); Ingraffia v. Doughtery, 29 North. Co. R. 294 (Pa. 1944); Seifer v.
Schwimmer, 1 N.Y.S.2d 730, 733 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937); Klahr v. Nadel, 1 N.Y.S.2d 733, 734-35
(N.Y. App. Div. 1937); In re Weinstein, 277 N.Y.S. 425, 425-26 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935); Datz v.
Dougherty, 41 Pa. D. & C. 505, 515-16 (1941).
7. See, e.g., Maffei v. Woodlawn Memorial Park, 130 Cal. App. 4th 119, 130 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 2005).
8. Mitty, 244 P.2d at 926.
9. Zablotower v. Mt. Zion Cemetery, 413 N.Y.S.2d 106, 107 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (citing
Grinnan v. Fredericksburg Lodge, 88 S.E. 79 (Va. 1916)).
10. Maffei, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 126.
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As summed up by one commentator:
Despite the inconsistencies with which American cases on
exhumation and removal of remains are rife, to this extent they all
agree in principle: The normal treatment of a corpse, once it is
decently buried, is to let it lie. This idea is so deeply woven into
our legal and cultural fabric that it is commonplace to hear it
spoken of as a “right” of the dead and a charge on the quick.
Neither the ecclesiastical, common, nor civil system of
jurisprudence permits exhumation for less than what are
considered weighty, and sometimes compelling, reasons. Securing
“unbroken final repose” has been the object of both civil and
criminal legislation.11
In those instances in which applications are considered, the factors relevant
to a decision regarding the disinterment of a decedent are: (1) the wishes of
the decedent; (2) the interest of the public; (3) the rights and feelings of
those entitled to be heard by reason of relationship or association; and, (4)
the rights and principles of the religious body which granted the right to
inter at the first place of burial.12
As articulated, these are neutral factors; in cases with respect to which
religion is not relevant, they are applied in a neutral fashion. However, for
those cases with respect to which religion is relevant, three of the four
factors are applied in a way that elevates religion to a controlling role in the
disinterment decision. It is to a discussion of the impact of religion on the
articulated equitable factors that this article now turns.
III. THE DOMINANT, INDEED CONTROLLING, ROLE OF RELIGION
A. WHEN A DECEDENT HAS LIVED HIS ADULT LIFE AS A DEVOTED
MEMBER OF A RELIGION PROHIBITING DISINTERMENT, THE
COURTS ARE UNANIMOUS IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DECEDENT
WOULD NOT WISH TO BE DISINTERRED
As stated above, when applications for disinterment are considered,
one of the critical factors relevant to the analysis is the decedent’s wishes
expressed in his or her lifetime.13 While only two courts have specifically

11. Removal and Reinterment, supra note 1, at 476.
12. The authorities in support of the application of these factors are legion. See, e.g., id. at
§ 2(a); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 67 (2007).
13. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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stated that they consider this factor to be the most significant,14 the fact is
that when a case involves a religious decedent, virtually all courts have
treated this factor with special deference; they have, in virtually every
published opinion, treated the decedent’s “wishes” and religious beliefs as
one in the same. In case after case, the courts have concluded that a
religiously devoted decedent would wish the tenets of his religion to remain
applicable in death, and that a decedent devoted to a religion prohibiting
disinterment would not wish to be disinterred; as a result, they have
categorically refused to allow disinterment. In so holding, those courts
have not relied on any particular statement—ambiguous, clear or otherwise
—of the deceased, but instead looked to the presence of a lifetime of
religious devotion.15
One of the first cases to apply this line of reasoning and proceed under
these assumptions was In re Donn,16 where the surviving children sought to
disinter the remains of their deceased mother and remove the remains to a
family plot.17 The mother had been a practicing Roman Catholic all her
life, and, pursuant to her request buried in a Roman Catholic cemetery.18 In
denying the petition for removal, the court put the greatest emphasis on the
decedent’s wishes, and determined her wishes by examining her religious
devotion.19 Specifically, the court first reviewed church law regarding
disinterment, stating that the cemetery was under the rules and regulations
of the Roman Catholic Church, that its grounds, pursuant to the rites and
canons of the Roman Catholic Church, had been consecrated to the burial of
the members thereof, and that the rules and canons of the Church forbade
the removal of bodies buried in consecrated grounds.20 The court concluded
that religious devotion was the ultimate determinant of the decedent’s
wishes, stating:

14. See Mitty v. Olivera, 244 P.2d 921, 926-27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Cordts v. Cordts,
118 P.2d 556, 558 (Kan. 1941) (“Speaking generally, perhaps primary importance is given to the
wishes of the deceased.”).
15. Removal and Reinterment, supra note 1, at 498. One thing the court seems to actually be
doing is to divine the wishes of the deceased; and if he were a staunch adherent of a given church,
it may be presumed that his wishes were that his remains should be treated in accordance with its
rules. Similarly, “[t]here is a presumption that, if the decedent was a devout member of a
religious organization whose principles were opposed to the disturbance of sepulcher, the
decedent would wish his or her remains to be treated in accordance with the rules of that religion.”
Dead Bodies, supra note 12, § 67.
16. 14 N.Y.S. 189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891).
17. In re Donn, 14 N.Y.S. at 189.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 190.
20. Id. at 189.
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There is, however, another and a more serious question. The
deceased was a member of a Roman Catholic Church. I assume
that she entertained the views in reference to her burial common to
the members of that body, and that she believed that her welfare
after death depended to some extent upon whether her body was
interred in ground consecrated by her church.21
Goldman v. Mollen 22 followed In re Donn. In Goldman, the children
of a deceased father sought to disinter his remains from an Orthodox Jewish
cemetery, and remove them to a Reformed Jewish cemetery so the remains
could rest next to the remains of his deceased wife and the children’s
mother.23 The court devoted much of its opinion to establishing that, while
the decedent never clearly stated where he wanted to be buried, his devotion
to his religion was critical proof of his wishes.24 The court began its
analysis by stating that while it was true that the decedent “did not
expressly state to anyone . . . where he desired to be buried, . . . he was
[nonetheless] an [O]rthodox Jew and was a member, officer and priest in
his synagogue.”25 From this, the court concluded “that h[is] desir[ing] that
his body . . . be dealt with according to the tenets of his faith was an
inevitable conclusion,”26 and that his “whole life is an impressive expression of his will.”27 The court expanded and commented upon the breadth of
its reasoning, stating:
We do not doubt that a devout Catholic would wish to be buried in
consecrated ground and would object to his body being taken from
such a place and put in a Protestant cemetery, and we do not doubt
that a Bombay Parsee would wish to come to final rest on Malabar
Hill. These are among the things we know without being told.28
The court then found that disinterment violated the tenets of Orthodox
Judaism and denied the petition for disinterment, concluding that “the
wishes of the deceased, particularly when their origin rests on matters of
faith, are not to be overlooked,” and that “[t]he faith of those surviving
might change but the wishes of the dead are irrevocable.”29

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 190.
191 S.E. 627 (Va. 1937).
Goldman, 191 S.E. at 628.
Id. at 634-35.
Id. at 631.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 633.
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Subsequently, in Ingraffia v. Doughtery,30 the court stated its views in
language still more profound. Ingraffia involved a wife who sought to
remove the remains of her deceased husband from a Roman Catholic
cemetery to a non-Catholic cemetery.31 The church authorities opposed the
widow because disinterment under such circumstances violated canon law.
In denying the widow the right to disinter, the court relied almost
exclusively on the fact that the decedent had been a devout Catholic, and
that even though he never stated a preference regarding his burial, such
devotion created a “compelling influence” regarding his wishes.32 On this
latter point, the court stated:
While [the decedent] did not by will or otherwise state his desire
as to burial, his continued adherence during his life to the Catholic
faith raises the compelling inference that he desired interment in
consecrated ground in accordance with the canons, rules and
regulations of the Catholic Church. Due regard for the religious
faith of [the decedent] requires us to keep inviolate that faith even
in his last repose.33
Then, in language that indicated the depth of the court’s feeling on the
issue, the court intoned that “to deny to the dead the faith which sustained
them in life is to deny to the living the faith that sustains them in death. In
this sense the fundamental American ideal of religious freedom transcends
the confines of the grave.”34
A California decision, Mitty v. Oliveira, 35 epitomizes these principles,
and accords ultimate respect to the wishes of the individual as manifest by
religious devotion in life. In Mitty, a widow sought to disinter and cremate
the remains of her deceased husband and sons, from a Roman Catholic
cemetery.36 The archbishop of the church opposed disinterment and cremation because the act violated Canon law.37 The court first stated that, as a
guiding legal principle, the wishes of the deceased were of “primary importance.”38 Then, the court applied this principle, and determined what those
wishes were, by relying, exclusively, on the fact that both the husband and

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

29 North Co. R. 294 (Pa. 1944).
Ingraffia, 29 North Co. R. at 300.
Id.
Id.
Id.
244 P.2d 921 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
Mitty, 244 P.2d at 924.
Id.
Id. at 926.
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son had lived their lives as devout Roman Catholics.39 Specifically, the
court focused on the fact that the decedents “lived and died members of a
church whose tenets placed great emphasis upon the importance of burial of
its members in consecrated ground and proscribed the cremation of their
remains;” and that, “[t]here is a presumption, from the very fact of their
membership in that church, that [they] subscribed to those tenets and
desired to be buried in compliance therewith.”40 Based on the decedents’
wishes as manifest by their actions (religious devotion) when alive, and the
tenets of the church to which they were devoted, the court denied the
petition for disinterment.41
Other jurisdictions have handed down identical holdings in all manner
of compelling circumstance. For example, in Friedman v. Gomel Chesed
Hebrew Cemetery Ass’n of Elizabeth,42 a case in which the children of a
deceased mother sought to disinter her remains from one religious cemetery
to a family plot in another cemetery, the court again focused its analysis on
the wishes of the decedent as manifest by her religious devotion.43
Specifically, the court stressed that the decedent was a practitioner of the
rules of the Orthodox Jewish faith, that she was a strict adherent to the
dietary laws of that faith, and that this adherence was “a measure of the
orthodoxy” of the decedent.44 Based upon this adherence, the court assumed that the decedent’s wishes were made manifest by her religious
devotion, stating: “She was in essence a practitioner or an adherent to the
tenets of the [O]rthodox Jewish faith and I assume that it was with her
approval that she was buried in consecrated ground, and that ‘the disinterment of the bodies buried in hallowed ground is not in accordance with
rabbinical law.’”45 After so assuming, the court concluded that to disturb
the repose of the body of the decedent would be in violation of deeply held
religious beliefs and would run counter to the wish of the deceased.46 The
court so held despite discussing as “praiseworthy and decorous” the
39. Id. at 926-27.
40. Id. at 926.
41. Id. at 927.
42. 92 A.2d 117 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952).
43. Id. at 118-19.
44. Id. at 118.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 119. The court also quoted Justice Cardozo as to the significance of the wishes of
the religiously devoted, stating:
I do not think I could take a better guide than that of Justice Cardozo, and I quote:
“The wish of the deceased, even though legal compulsion may not attach to it has at
least a large significance. Especially is this so when the wish has its origin in intense
religious feeling.”
Id. (quoting Yome v. Gorman, 152 N.E. 126, 128 (N.Y. 1926)).
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feelings “of kinsmen near in blood to satisfy a longing that those united
during life shall not be divided after death.”47
Similarly, in Dutcher v. Paradise,48 the decedent’s father sought to
have his son’s remains disinterred from a Roman Catholic cemetery and
removed to a family plot.49 The court stated that, “[i]n great measure the
resolution of this issue is governed by the wishes of the decedent,” but the
parties presented statements attributed to the decedent that conflicted as to
his wishes regarding his last resting place.50 In resolving the conflict and
denying the petition for disinterment, the court again considered religious
devotion the ultimate determinant of the decedent’s wishes.51 Specifically,
relying on the fact that the decedent had been a devout Roman Catholic, the
court stated “that [the] decedent was a lay catechist, . . . which indicates
that, in accordance with the tenets of his faith, he would undoubtedly prefer
to be buried in St. Mary’s Cemetery, which has been consecrated by the
Roman Catholic Church, rather than in the unconsecrated Prospect Hill
Cemetery.”52
As the foregoing cases illustrate, there have been a significant number
of published opinions involving decedents who during their lifetimes were
religiously devoted, but who never unambiguously, or sufficiently as a
matter of law, expressed the wish that their remains rest undisturbed as
proscribed by the tenets of their faith. In every such case, and in language
that is often compelling, the courts have attached ultimate significance to,
and drawn definitive assumptions from, the fact that the decedent led a
religious life and have denied the next of kin the right to disinter.
B. THERE ARE NO REPORTED COMMON LAW CASES ALLOWING
DISINTERMENT OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF A CEMETERY
GOVERNED BY A RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION WHOSE RELIGIOUS
BELIEFS CLEARLY PROHIBIT DISINTERMENT
For over a century, the common law has dictated that the sanctity of
consecrated ground be protected, and that disinterment from a religious
cemetery controlled by the denomination that proscribes disinterment
simply not be allowed in cases of purely private disputes.53 From a narrow
legal perspective, the protection from desecration by disinterment afforded
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
629 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1995).
Dutcher, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
Id. at 502.
Id.
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 61-144.
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consecrated ground is found among the factors that courts consider in
disinterment cases generally. As stated previously, one of the factors
articulated unanimously by the courts is “the rights and principles of the
religious body or other institution, which granted the right to inter the body
at the first place of burial.”54 From a broader perspective, this factor is in
some ways subsumed by the factors which seek to respect the beliefs of the
religious individual, and in other ways is greater than the sum of those
individual beliefs. To wit, if an individual believes that his remains must
rest undisturbed so as to accomplish a divine purpose, then the religious
authorities opposing disinterment are respecting and protecting the beliefs
of the individual; in this way, considerations relevant to a religion generally
are subsumed by the equitable factors related to the decedent’s wishes.55 At
the same time, requiring that the rights and beliefs of the religious
denomination governing the place of interment be considered protects the
tenets of the entire religious community to which the individual chose to
belong. Considering the tenets of the relevant faith opposed to disinterment
avoids shocking the religious feelings of the members of the affected
religious community,56 offending adherents of an entire faith,57 and desecrating holy ground, along with all of the negative connotations that that
implies.58
Regardless of the perspective taken on this factor—be it to protect the
beliefs of the decedent or to preserve the tenets of an entire faith—the end
result is the same: no reported decision has ever sanctioned disinterment
from sanctified ground when disinterment was opposed by the religion
governing that ground. One of the seminal case applying this factor is
Mitty.59 On the issue of considering and respecting the tenets of the faith
opposed to disinterment, the court began its analysis by observing that
“frequently . . . the prohibitions of religious law . . . require attention.”60
Then, in refusing to allow disinterment despite the compelling case made
by the next of kin (mother), the court held: “The church, which controls this
cemetery, withholds its consent. That withholding is neither whimsical nor
unreasonable, we think, in view of the very tenets we have mentioned.”61

54. Mitty v. Oliveira, 244 P.2d 921, 926 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (quoting Dead Bodies,
supra note 12, § 22); In re Keck, 171 P.2d 933, 936 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946).
55. See Removal and Reinterment, supra note 1, at 498.
56. See, e.g., Seifer v. Schwimmer, 1 N.Y.S.2d 730, 732-33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937).
57. See, e.g., Klahr v. Nadel, 1 N.Y.S.2d 733, 734 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937).
58. See, e.g., In re Weinstein, 277 N.Y.S. 425, 425-26 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
60. Mitty v. Oliveira, 244 P.2d 924, 926 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
61. Id. at 927.
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Finally, the court specifically “mentioned” those tenets in great detail,
noting, inter alia, that: (1) “all rights of interment [and disinterment] in
cemeteries of the Roman Catholic Church . . . have been and are regulated
by and subject to the canons of the Church;” (2) “the canon law of the
[C]hurch . . . has prohibited and still prohibits removal of bodies from any
Roman Catholic cemetery for cremation;” (3) “all [Roman Catholic] cemeteries are blessed pursuant to prescribed rites of the church and regarded by
all Roman Catholics in good standing as consecrated ground, and the
removal of the remains of a Roman Catholic buried [in a Roman Catholic
cemetery,] . . . for the purpose of cremation, is regarded as a profanation
and desecration of the remains;” (4) “the cemeteries within any Archdiocese
have been and are subject to certain rules and regulations prescribed by the
Archbishop of that Archdiocese, . . . including [rules] which prohibit[]
removal from such a cemetery of the body of any [C]atholic in good
standing which has been interred therein;” and, (5) “all rights of interment
have been and are subject to certain rules and regulations of the cemetery,
including one which prohibits the removal of a body interred therein, without the written consent of the Archbishop of the . . . [relevant] Archdiocese
or the Reverend Director of the cemeteries of [that] Archdiocese.”62
The position taken by the Mitty court finds universal support from
every other case involving ground sanctified by a religion which strictly
prohibits disinterment. Thus, in Friedman v. Agudath Achim North Shore
Congregation,63 the court held that the surviving children who wished to
have their parents reintered in a family plot were not entitled to disinter the
bodies of their parents from ground sanctified by Orthodox Judaism as
codified in the Shulchan Oruch.64 In declining to issue the injunction
allowing disinterment despite the laudable reason profferred in support of
disinterment, the court relied, inter alia, on the fact that disinterment was
contrary to the tenets of the Orthodox Jewish religion and would offend the
precepts of the congregation.65 The court so held despite the fact that the
decedents themselves, though Jewish, were not Orthodox.66
In Seifer v. Schwimmer,67 the court held that the surviving children who
wished to reinter the remains of their father next to those of their mother
were not entitled to disinter the father’s remains from ground sanctified by

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 924.
115 N.E.2d 553 (Ill. App. Ct. 1953).
Friedman, 115 N.E.2d at 557.
Id.
Id.
1 N.Y.S.2d 730 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937).
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Orthodox Jewry.68 In declining to issue an injunction allowing disinterment
despite the laudable reasons proffered, the court relied upon the fact that
disinterment would constitute a desecration of the sanctified burial ground,
and would otherwise be regarded as a “horror” by Orthodox Jewry.69
In Klahr v. Nudel,70 the court held that the surviving children who
wished to reinter the remains of their father in a family plot would not be
allowed to disinter his remains from ground sanctified by Orthodox
Jewry.71 As stated earlier, the court was extremely sensitive to the intentions of the children, noting the laudable wish of the family to place the
body of their sire in a plot of their own,72 and stating that “[i]t is impossible
to escape the natural desire to sympathize with the sentiments and hopes of
the bereaved.”73 Nevertheless, the court felt bound to uphold the tenet of
Orthodox Jewry that prohibited disinterment. On this point, which commands the bulk of the court’s analysis, the court summed up its view by
stating that while ecclesiastical law cannot control equity, it was “impossible to set at naught with heedlessness and indifference the traditions and
rules of any religion, particularly so long established a creed as that of
Jewry.”74 The court so held even though disinterment may not have been
against the decedent’s wishes.75
In In re Weinstein,76 the court reversed a trial court ruling that would
have allowed a widow to disinter, from a Jewish cemetery, the remains of
her husband so that they could be reinterred in a cemetery where she could
ultimately be interred next to him.77 In making its ruling, the court assumed
not only that the widow’s motives were compelling and laudable, but also
that she did not expressly consent to her husband’s burial in the cemetery. 78
Despite the compelling nature of both her motives and objections, the court
seemed to be trying to minimize them, and, in turn, elevate the religious
considerations. Specifically, the court justified its reversal primarily on the
fact that the widow “attended the services proceeding the burial and also at

68. Seifer, 1 N.Y.S.2d at 733.
69. Id.
70. 1 N.Y.S.2d 733 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937).
71. Klahr, 1 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 734.
74. Id. at 735.
75. Id. In this sense, Friedman and Klahr may represent the ultimate in deference to the
tenets of a religion, as these courts evaluated this consideration over both the wishes of the
decedent (as assumed from their religious devotion) and the next-of-kin.
76. 277 N.Y.S. 425 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935).
77. Weinstein, 277 N.Y.S. at 425.
78. Id.
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the interment,”79 and that it appeared that the decedent was “buried in holy
Jewish ground and that it is against the custom and violates the law and
tenets of Hebrew faith to remove the remains of one who has been buried in
a Jewish cemetery.”80 Additionally, disinterment would “render the burial
ground unholy and would result in other members of the defendant society
refusing to be buried in the plot.”81
Finally, as discussed earlier, in Ingraffia,82 the court held that a widow
could not disinter and remove remains of her deceased husband from a
Roman Catholic cemetery to a nonsectarian one. In refusing to allow the
disinterment the court stated that because the remains had been interred in
ground consecrated by the Catholic Church, they could not be removed in
violation of the canons of the Church.83
It is significant that all of the reported cases prohibiting disinterment
support the position of religious institutions whose beliefs prohibit such
action. Equally significant is the fact that the cases allowing disinterment
support these religious institutions as well; for, in every case in which
disinterment was allowed, permission was granted only after a specific
finding that disinterment did not violate the beliefs of the religion at issue.
Thus, in Viscomi v. McGuire,84 the court held that an Episcopalian
husband, over the objection of his sister-in-law, would be permitted to
disinter the remains of his deceased wife, who had also been Episcopalian. 85
The court articulated and considered the same equitable factors as have
been previously established; regarding those relating to religion and
religiously sanctified ground, the court concluded that the cemetery “had no
objection throughout and expresses its written consent to the . . . request
[for disinterment],”86 and that, “[n]o evidence is presented by the sister
that . . . the Episcopalian faith . . . precludes disinterment or reburial.”87
In Petition of Davis,88 the court allowed a husband to disinter the
remains of his wife over the opposition of a particular congregation, but
only after finding that the opposition “was based on disputed and doubtful
custom and usage of religious tenets” of the congregation owning the

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id. at 425-26.
Id. at 426.
See supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
Id.
647 N.Y.S.2d 397 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996).
Viscomi, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 400.
192 N.Y.S.2d 174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
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portion of the cemetery in which the decedent was buried.89 More specifically, with respect to the beliefs of the particular congregation at issue, the
court concluded that “[t]he particular custom and usage here involved is one
on which even rabbinical authorities disagree,” and that some of the
relevant rabbinical authorities believed that “disinterment and removal to a
family plot is permissible.”90
In Application of Stanton,91 a widow was allowed to disinter the
remains of her deceased husband, but only after the court conclusively
established that no good faith religious objection existed.92 Specifically, the
court noted that the only religious objection was made not by a religious
authority but by a domestic fraternal organization, and that the potentially
relevant religious authorities were in conflict, and most tellingly, that the
application was “opposed ostensibly on the ground that ‘Orthodox Jewish
law provides that a grave once opened cannot be used for burial purposes
for a period of seven years,’” but that the real reason, was that
“someone . . . might seek to recover the moneys paid for the purchase of the
grave.”93
In Application of Rosenwasser,94 the court allowed surviving children
to disinter the remains of their deceased parents, but only after concluding
that the congregation in control of the cemetery itself filed an affidavit
stating that the relevant religion tenets were flexible, and that disinterment
was permitted upon consent of designated ecclesiastical authority.95 Absent
such an affidavit, it seems unlikely that the court would have allowed
disinterment; in dicta, the court stated: “[T]his Court is not in accord with
violation of religious tenets.”96
In several cases, the courts appeared to have admitted extensive
testimony from religious organizations before allowing disinterment. Thus,
in Application of Baron,97 the court allowed a widow to disinter the remains
of her deceased husband from a Jewish cemetery, but only after concluding
that there was significant rabbinical support for allowing the disinterment. 98
The discussion of the relevant rabbinical views was particularly detailed.
Found most persuasive by the court were the affidavits of Rabbi Harry
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Petition of Davis, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 174.
Id. at 176.
216 N.Y.S.2d 384 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961).
Application of Stanton, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
Id.
120 N.Y.S.2d 287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953).
Application of Rosenwasser, 120 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
Id. at 288.
140 N.Y.S.2d 279 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
Application of Baron, 140 N.Y.S.2d at 281.
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Halpern, President of the Rabbinical Assembly of America and the National
Organization of Conservative Rabbis in the United States and Canada, who
averred that:
It is my opinion that since Jewish Law is always concerned with
respect for the dead and since the purpose of this disinterment is to
take the remains of the deceased from a single grave and place it in
a family plot where other members of the family will be buried,
this is a gesture of added respect for the deceased and is
permissible according to Jewish Law.99
H. S. Linfield, executive secretary of the Jewish Statistical Bureau, stated
the following from the applicable law as written in the religious code: “It is
prohibited to remove the dead from one grave to another. However, it is
permissible to do so if the removal is to a family plot.”100
In Herzl Congregation v. Robinson,101 the court allowed the parents to
disinter the remains of the deceased son over the objection of the religious
authorities governing the cemetery, but only after concluding that there was
a serious conflict as to the tenets governing disinterment.102 Specifically,
the court stated: “[i]n the instant case, there is a serious conflict in the
testimony as to whether or not the rules and regulations of the Orthodox
Jewish Church would permit the disinterment of a body, particularly in
view of the fact that the purpose thereof was to bury it in another Jewish
cemetery.”103
In Raisler v. Krakauer Simon Schreiber Congregation,104 the court
allowed the surviving children to disinter the remains of their deceased
parents over the objections of the Jewish congregation that had sold them
burial rights.105 The court allowed the disinterment only after determining
that the one of the most important rabbis of the Western World had
concluded that disinterment under the circumstances did not violate Jewish
law.106 On the issue of disinterment under Jewish law, the rabbi
99. Id. at 280.
100. Id. (quoting Yoreh Deah in 2 CARO CODE, ch. 363, ¶ 1).
101. 253 P. 654 (Wash. 1927).
102. Herzl Congregation, 253 P. at 655.
103. Id.
104. 47 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1944).
105. Raisler, 47 N.Y.S.2d at 939 (observing that the actual cemetery did not object to their
disinterment).
106. Id. Specifically, the court relied on an arbitration decision by Rabbi Moses Hyamson,
and noted his qualifications as follows: B.A., L.L.B., L.L.D. (University of London), who had
been the dean of
the Ecclesiastical and Arbitration Board of the United Synagogue of London, England,
then the Supreme Jewish Court of the British Empire, . . . the Chief Rabbinate of the
British Empire; the author of books, pamphlets and essays including “The Oral Law”
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“recognized the right of children to remove to a family burial plot the
remains of their parents, regardless of the fact that such family plot contained no burials theretofore,” and that “there is no force to the point made,
that a cemetery plot is worthless after one is disinterred, except that the
grave may not be used by a child of the deceased, where the disinterment
has been made in proper cases.”107
Finally, in Currier v. Woodlawn Cemetery,108 the court allowed a son
to disinter the remains of his deceased mother, but only after concluding
that there was no religious opposition.109 Specifically, the court stated,
inter alia, “[i]f the deceased had been a member of a faith which forbade
disinterment . . . then only compelling considerations would justify disinterment and removal. But the case before us presents no such factors.”110
As the foregoing litany of cases illustrates, disinterment from consecrated ground has never been permitted when it violates the beliefs of the
religious denomination at issue. Rather, disinterment has only been allowed when religious beliefs are not relevant or permit the practice.
Application of Sherman111 is the only relevant case that arguably runs
counter to the published opinion discussed herein. In that case, a widow
was allowed to disinter the remains of her deceased husband and remove
them to a family plot.112 Disinterment was allowed under circumstances in
which the husband had been a member of a synagogue, and the synagogue
and its Rabbi opposed the application.113 There was no discussion, however, as to which denomination of Judaism was involved, whether that
denomination forbade disinterment, or whether the decedent was devoted to
it. Rather, disinterment was opposed “on the grounds that there are deed
restriction against disinterments and that the application is not made in good
faith.”114 Most critically, the court allowed the disinterment because it felt
that the bonds of matrimony were stronger than the religious bonds, stating

and “Collatio of Roman and Mosaic Law;” . . . a Professor of Codes of the Jewish
Theological Seminary[; the] life Rabbi of the Congregation Orach Chaim; a
contributor to Jewish Journals in England and the United States; . . . president of the
New York Board of Jewish Ministers[;] . . . [and] a Rabbinical Vice-President of the
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America and Vice-President of the
Jewish Conciliation Board of New York, which he had helped to found.
Id. at 939-40.
107. Id. at 940.
108. 90 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 1949).
109. Currier, 90 N.E.2d at 19.
110. Id. (citations omitted).
111. 107 N.Y.S.2d 905 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
112. Application of Sherman, 107 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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that “[t]he bonds of marriage are strong and to be upheld; separation after
death of those who have been joined in matrimony cannot be lightly permitted.”115 As such, Sherman appears to be the only published opinion that
even arguably elevates the wishes of the next of kin over the interests of the
relevant religion.
C. REDUCING A STATUTORY IMPERATIVE TO AN EQUITABLE
CONSIDERATION OF PUBLIC INTEREST: THE CURIOUS TREATMENT
OF SEEMINGLY UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTES
Deference to religion in the disinterment context, as manifest in legal
protection from desecration afforded religiously consecrated ground, is not
limited to the equitable factors discussed herein. More recently, some state
legislatures have bolstered this protection by specifically according statutory rights to those who control religious cemeteries.116 Typically, these
statutes provide that once a decedent is interred in a religiously consecrated
cemetery the remains cannot be disinterred except in accordance with the
rules, regulations, or canons of the controlling religious denomination; that
the relevant representation of the religious are the sole judges of these
restrictions; and that the rights of the controlling religious entity operate
against the next-of-kin.117
Based on the language of these statutes, it would seem that the next-ofkin could not disinter from cemeteries controlled by religious denominations that adhere to rules, regulations, or canons that prohibit disinterment.118 Yet, despite what appears to be a clearly stated statutory right of a
religious entity to prohibit disinterment from its cemetery, the courts have
not in any way deferred to the statutes. Rather, the courts have considered
the statutes nothing more than somewhat relevant to the application of the
equitable factors governing disinterment—typically the “interest of the
public” factor.119
One prime example of so treating a statute is provided by California.
Specifically, Section 7980 of the California Health and Safety Code
decrees:
The heirs, relatives or friends of any decedent whose remains have
been interred in any cemetery owned, governed or controlled by

115. Id.
116. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7980 (West 2007); 10 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 81 (West 2006).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Ingraffia v. Doughtery, 29 North. Co. R. 294, 300 (Pa. 1944).
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any religious corporation . . . shall not disinter, remove, reinter or
dispose of any such remains except in accordance with the rules,
regulations and discipline of such religious denomination, society
or church. The officers, representatives or agents of the church or
religious society shall be the sole judge of the requirements of the
rules, regulations and discipline of such religious denomination,
society or church.120
It is difficult to imagine greater protection afforded consecrated ground
than the one mandated by Section 7980. This impression is confirmed not
only by the plain meaning of the language noted above, but also by the
analysis of the legislative history of Section 7980. The provision was
derived from Section 17 of Chapter 312 of the statutes of 1923, which
governed removal of remains upon the abandonment of a cemetery.121
Then, in 1931, the 1923 statute was made a part of the General Cemetery
Act, by operation of Chapter 1148, page 2434, Section 28 at pages 2448-49
of the 1931 codification.122
This history was subsequently analyzed by the Mitty court.123 Based
upon this history, the court concluded that Section 7980 “literally applied to
everything in the General Cemetery Act,” including private action for
disinterment brought by relatives of the decedent.124 The court also noted
that the original draft of Section 7980 was prefaced with the phrase
“Nothing in this act . . . shall authorize or permit,” that this preface created
ambiguity as to whether disinterment was prohibited if opposed by the
religious denomination, and that the preface was omitted in the final
drafts.125
Nonetheless, despite recognizing what it itself termed an unambiguous
statute, the court concluded that when a burial has been made in a religious
cemetery as described in Section 7980, that section did nothing more than
“give[] preference to the rules, regulations and discipline of the church over

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7980 (West 2007).
Mitty v. Oliveira, 244 P.2d 921, 928 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
Mitty, 244 P.2d at 928.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the desires of the relatives of the decedent.”126 The court also concluded
that the statute was nothing more than an expression of a policy.127
A second, though subtler, example of this phenomenon is found in
Pennsylvania law. Specifically, similar to Section 7980 of the California
Health and Safety Code, Pennsylvania statutory laws provides:
Whensoever any property . . . has heretofore been or shall
hereafter be bequeathed, devised, or conveyed to any ecclesiastical
corporation, bishop, ecclesiastic, or other person, for the use of any
church . . . for or in trust for . . . sepulture, . . . the same shall be
taken and held subject to the control and disposition of such
officers or authorities of such church . . . having a controlling
power according to the rules, regulations, usages, or corporate
requirements of such church, . . . which control and subject to the
rules and regulations, usages, canons, discipline and requirements
of the religious body, denomination or organization to which such
church . . . shall belong.”128
Datz v. Dougherty129 was the first case in which this statute was
applied. The Datz court held that a surviving spouse who wished to reinter
her husband’s remains so that the entire family could be buried together
could not disinter her husband from ground sanctified by the Roman
Catholic Church in violation of the tenets of the Church.130 In support of
the holding, the court focused in part on the equitable factors, and in part on
the statute, stating: “The facts themselves necessarily bring into consideration, and most careful consideration, the control of the ecclesiastical laws of
deceased’s church over his last resting place. . . .”131 Ultimately, the court
concluded that disinterment could not be allowed because “[u]nder the
cases cited pursuant to that act[,] there can be no dispute that church law is
paramount in the control of cemeteries,” and that the requirement that
“burials are made in ecclesiastical cemeteries subject to the rules,

126. Id. Specifically, the appellate court considered, inter alia, that burial had been
“effected . . . in full conformity with the rules, regulations and discipline of the church,” and
concluded that: “this is a case for observance of the policy expressed in section 7980 of the Code,
which does not sanction removal except in conformity with the rules, regulations and discipline of
the church. Id. at 929.
127. Id.
128. 10 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 81 (West 2006).
129. 41 Pa. D. & C. 505 (1941).
130. Datz, 41 Pa. D. & C. at 513.
131. Id. at 506.
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regulations, canons, and discipline of the church, must be held to apply to
removals as well.”132
As such, the Datz court appeared to be relying on the statute in a
significant way. However, the importance of the statute appears to have
been undermined in Ingraffia.133 As discussed previously, Ingraffia denied
an application for disinterment from ground consecrated by the Roman
Catholic Church. Regarding the Pennsylvania statute, the court recognized
that:
The rules and regulations, usages, canons, discipline, and requirements of religious denominations or organizations relative to the
right of Sepulcher have been written into the law of the State by
the Act of June 20, 1936, P. L. 353, section I (10 P.S. 81), and by
the decisions of our courts . . . the pertinent canons of the Catholic
Church and the pertinent rules and regulations of cemeteries of the
Catholic Church, are written into the law of the State by the
aforesaid Act of Assembly.134
Despite this recognition, the court held that the statute was only one factor
to consider in making a disinterment decision, i.e., the factor relating to the
interest of the public. Specifically, the court stated:
Reference has already been made to the fact that such restrictions
are part of the law of the State and must be considered by a court
of equity in passing upon the propriety of a reinterment.
....
The effectuation of plaintiffs’ wishes would not only violate the
aforementioned policy of the law, but would also violate the
fundamental concept of the sanctity of religious beliefs. To this
extent plaintiffs’ wishes run counter to the interests of the
public.135

132. Id. at 513-14; see also Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, 42 Pa. 293, 303 (1862) (finding a widow
could not disinter remains of her deceased husband from a church cemetery when disinternment
was opposed by the church because, inter alia, the body lay in “consecrated ground” and “was
buried with the ceremonies of the church”).
133. Ingraffia v. Doughtery, 29 North. Co. R. 294, Pincite (Pa. 1944).
134. Id. at 298.
135. Id. at 298, 300.
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IV. THE RELEVANCE, OR LACK THEREOF, OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE
In the middle of the nineteenth century, American courts recognized
that disinterment decisions in the United States were the province of civil
courts applying equitable principles, and not ecclesiastical courts (or civil
courts, for that mater) applying ecclesiastical law.136 Though the courts
rarely, if ever, specifically invoked the Establishment Clause137 as justification, their early holdings are certainly consistent with it, and with general
principles of separation of church and state.
The earliest significant American case grounding the disinterment
decision in secular, as opposed to ecclesiastical law was In re Beekman
Street.138 In that case, the City of New York condemned an eighteenth
century cemetery, and made a lump sum payment to the religious corporation that had been maintaining the grounds.139 Litigation arose when the
claimant—the daughter of one of the decedents interred in the cemetery—
sought a portion of the payment to cover the costs of removing and reinterring her father’s remains. A decision to indemnify the daughter was ultimately based upon the report of Referee Samuel B. Ruggles. The thesis of
the report was that historically, in England, protecting remains was within
the jurisdiction of the common law, but the ecclesiastical courts gradually
usurped that jurisdiction; as there were no ecclesiastical courts in America,
the ancient and rightful authority of the secular courts had to be restored.140
Forty years later, In re Donn reached the same conclusion in an
equitable context. As stated earlier, In re Donn involved surviving children
who sought an order allowing them to disinter the remains of their mother
from a Roman Catholic cemetery, which opposed disinterment as against
the canons of the church.141 The court ultimately denied equitable relief,
i.e., denied a motion to order disinterment, but only after stressing that the
Roman Catholic Church had no jurisdiction over the matter.142 Specifically, the court reviewed the historical English doctrine on this subject, and
agreed with the Ruggles report in all relevant respects.143 The court then
concluded that, in the United States:
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See infra text accompanying notes 138-145; Removal and Reinterment, supra note 1, § 4.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Removal and Reinterment, supra note 1, § 4(b).
Id.
Id.
In re Donn, 14 N.Y.S. 189, 189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891).
Id. at 190.
Id.
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While we grant to all religious organizations the largest and
broadest latitude and liberty to adopt all or any proper rules or
regulations, to the end that their votaries may worship God
according to the dictates of their conscience, we have jealously
watched and resisted any and all attempts on their part to usurp
powers or authority outside or beyond their legitimate functions of
caring for and administering spiritual affairs.144
After being first articulated in the nineteenth century, the notion that
secular courts applying equitable principles were the sole arbiters of
disinterment disputes became entrenched doctrine by the middle of the
twentieth century. As stated by the court in Friedman v. Gomel Chesed
Hebrew Cemetery Association of Elizabeth: “This court is not bound by the
ecclesiastical law. That is too well established to need citation of
authorities.”145
While entrenching this perhaps evident doctrine, however, the courts
were simultaneously according religious law great deference while making
their equitable determinations. Most extreme in this regard is Ingraffia.146
As noted earlier, the court in Ingraffia denied an equitable motion for
disinterment based in large part on the fact that the canon law of the Roman
Catholic Church forbade disinterment. In so holding, the court came very
close to literally equating state law with canon law, stating:
The rules and regulations, usages, canons, discipline and requirements of religious denominations or organizations relative to the
right of sepulcher have been written into the law of the State by
the Act of June 20, 1935, P.L. 353, section 1 (10 P.S. 81); and by
the decisions of our courts. The law recognizes and upholds
reasonable cemetery regulations where, as here, the cemetery has
reserved the right to regulate. Clearly, then, the pertinent canons
of the Catholic Church and the pertinent rules and regulations of
cemeteries of the Catholic Church, which prohibit disinterment
from a Catholic Cemetery to a non-Catholic cemetery, are written
into the law of the State by the aforesaid Act of Assembly and the
decisions thereunder.
....

144. Id.
145. Friedman v. Gomel Chesed Hebrew Cemetery Ass’n of Elizabeth, 92 A.2d 117, 118
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952).
146. Ingraffia v. Doughtery, 29 North Co. R. 294 (Pa. 1944).
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The effectuation of plaintiffs’ wishes would contravene the
ecclesiastical and cemetery restrictions of the Catholic Church.
Reference has already been made to the fact that such restrictions
are part of the law of the State and must be considered by a court
of equity in passing upon the propriety of a reinterment.147
To a lesser degree, virtually every case discussed herein affords
religion the same deference. Even Friedman, which, as quoted earlier,
considered that it was not necessary to even cite cases in support of the
proposition that ecclesiastical law could not control secular courts, stated in
the clause immediately subsequent that “it is equally well established that,
while not bound by the ecclesiastical law in any given case, the court, in
arriving at its decision, should consider the ecclesiastical law and give to it
such weight as will bring out an equitable result.”148
Given this verbiage, eventually, perhaps inevitably, one court finally
concluded that the deference accorded religion reached an unconstitutional
level, and found the entire equitable analysis to be in violation of the
Establishment Clause. Thus, in Wolf v. Rose Hill Cemetery Ass’n,149 the
plaintiff sought to have her father and sister disinterred from an Orthodox
Jewish cemetery and reinterred in a family plot; the cemetery opposed the
request on religious grounds.150 The trial court heard testimony from both
Orthodox and Reform rabbis, and from others regarding the role religion
played in the lives of the decedents.151 The court then relied on this
testimony in applying the four equitable factors, denying disinterment in a
way that has come to be expected in religion cases.152 Specifically,
regarding the intentions of the decedents, the court inferred from the
testimony of the Orthodox rabbis that the decedent father was an Orthodox
Jew, and would therefore not want to be disinterred in violation of Jewish
laws.153 Regarding the interests of the cemetery, the court concluded that
disinterment in violation of Jewish law would have a negative impact on it.
Regarding the public interest, the court concluded that desecration of
hollowed ground would have a negative impact on “others.”154

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 298, 300.
Friedman, 92 A.2d at 118.
832 P.2d 1007 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
Wolf, 832 P.2d at 1007-08.
Id. at 1008.
Id. at 1009.
Id.
Id. at 1008.
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The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the analysis of
the lower court, which, again, comported with the traditional equitable
analysis as applied in cases involving religious decedents, was unconstitutional in that it was based on the resolution of conflicting theological principles, and was therefore inconsistent with the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.155
The court reasoned that these Amendments, as applied by the Supreme
Court in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Null Memorial
Presbyterian Church,156 dictated the disinterment dispute be decided
pursuant to “neutral principles of law.”157 In remanding, the court held that
“neutral principles of law” dictated that the traditional equitable analysis be
modified so as to consider only: (1) “[t]he intent of the decedent and wishes
of the surviving spouse or next of kin;” (2) “[w]hether a written contract
between the cemetery and decedent or next of kin exists that discusses
rights of removal;” (3) “[l]ength of time interred;” (4) “[t]he practicality of
disinterment;” and, (5) “[i]mpact of disinterments on others.”158
If Wolf is correct, virtually every court that rendered a decision
involving a religious decedent would have done so pursuant to an analytical
framework that also violated the Establishment Clause. For over a century
the courts have heard testimony, sometimes conflicting, on the dictates of
religious law,159 and concluded that, as adherents to a religion, decedents
would wish their remains were dealt with according to the relevant religious
dictates.160 Consistency of past application, of course, is no reason to perpetuate an unconstitutional analysis. The Wolf formulation of the equitable
factors, however, presents difficulties of its own. From an evidentiary
perspective, it seems impossible to determine the intent of the religious
decedent without referring to the religious precepts by which he or she
lived. Indeed, if the interment decision were guided by those precepts,
refusing to consider them in the context of disinterment would result in a
baseless finding regarding the intent of the decedent. It would be equally
impossible, or baseless, to determine the impact of disinterment on others if
the “others” are congregants of the decedent for whom the impact of the
disinterment of the decedent is also shaped by the same religious precepts.
From a constitutional perspective, the equitable courts do not appear to
be trying to resolve disputed issues of religious doctrine, in violation of the
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 1009.
393 U.S. 440 (1969).
Wolf v. Rose Hill Cemetery Ass’n, 832 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
See supra text accompanying notes 13-115.
Id.
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Establishment Clause. Rather, while they are recognizing that different
denominations of a religion have different views regarding disinterment,
they are simply trying to determine to which denomination the decedent
belonged. In this sense, the equitable courts may be walking a fine line
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.161
On the latter point, a few courts, falling on the other side of the line as
compared to Wolf, have suggested that the Free Exercise Clause actually
requires the equitable courts to consider the religious views of the decedent.
In the context of religious opposition to an autopsy the court in Atkins v.
Medical Examiner of Westchester County,162 suggested this by stating:
Freedom of religion which necessarily includes the right to follow
the tenet of one’s faith is one of the most basic and fundamental
concepts of a democratic form of government. So vital is this right
that it has been embodied in and remains guaranteed by both our
state and federal constitutions.
....
The individual’s right of free choice in such an important area as
religion must prevail over the State’s curiosity as to the cause of
death. The bereaved have a right to proclaim that a body once laid
to rest should no longer be disturbed—that the dead be allowed to
rest in peace and that the body be returned to its Maker in the form
and manner best calculated to insure His favor.163
Another, in the context of disinterment, was Ingraffia, which stated:
the decedent requires us to keep inviolate that faith even in his last
repose. To deny to the dead the faith which sustained them in life
is to deny to the living the faith that sustains them in death. In this
sense the fundamental American ideal of religious freedom
transcends the confines of the grave.164
Tamarkin v. Children of Israel Inc.165 is the decision that has gone the
furthest in making the Free Exercise Clause relevant to the disinterment of a
religious decedent. In Tamarkin, an Orthodox Jewish congregation alleged
that applying a state statute granting the next of kin the right to disinter was
“contrary to the religious beliefs of the Orthodox Jewish religion and [was],

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
418 N.Y.S.2d 839 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
Atkins, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
Ingraffia v. Dougherty, 29 North Co. R. 294, 300 (Pa. 1944).
206 N.E.2d 412 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965).
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therefore, an unconstitutional interference with their religious beliefs.”166
The court determined that the constitutional issue would only be before it if
the congregation could prove that the religious beliefs and wishes of the
decedents forbade disinterment and were therefore contrary to the wishes of
the next of kin to disinter.167 In determining that the decedents did not hold
such contrary religious views, the Tamarkin court considered the very
evidence that the Wolf court deemed in violation of the Establishment
Clause, to wit, conflicting views regarding a particular tenet of the Jewish
religion, Rabbinical testimony, and the personal religious beliefs of the
deceased.168
Ultimately, when the doctrine of and notions stemming from the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause are balanced, the
analysis returns to the traditional equitable one. As summarized by the
court in Tamarkin:
The . . . cases hold that ecclesiastical law is not binding on a court,
but it may be competent evidence to show customs and wishes of
those who observe its mandates. These cases seem to turn on the
fact that the deceaseds were devout members of their respective
religions, and the presumption would be that their wishes were that
their remains should be treated in accordance with the rules of
their religion.169
V. CONCLUSION
For over a century, the courts in the United States have been
proclaiming that disinterment decisions are the province of civil, as opposed
to ecclesiastical, courts. While this may be true from a constitutional and
general jurisprudential perspective, the fact remains that religion, when
relevant, completely controls the decision to disinter. While this phenomenon may raise Establishment Clause issues, religion appears destined to
maintain its controlling role nonetheless.
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